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ABSTRACT 
In the light of the dramatic events of the 25 January 2011 Egyptian Revolution, many 
media sources gave too much credit to social media and often labeled it as the “Facebook 
and Twitter revolution” while dismissing the role of Egypt’s most important asset, the 
Egyptian citizens. This thesis aimed to explore the role and impact of the new social 
media on sustained social mobilization and the outcome of the 25 January 2011 Egyptian 
Revolution that led to the ousting of former President Hosni Mubarak. The research 
showed that social media was a vital tool that enabled preexisting networks to override 
state repressive measures; however, social media was only one of many tools (or factors) 
that smoothed the progress of social mobilization, and to some limited extent, had an 
impact on the outcome of the revolution. In sum, both online and offline tools, tactics and 
strategies, as well as political opportunities facilitated social mobilization, 
communication, and organization of Egyptian revolutionaries, and therefore, all impacted 
the outcome of the revolution. 
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 
B. IMPORTANCE................................................................................................1 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES ...............................................................3 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 
1. Introduction..........................................................................................4 
2. First School of Thought: The New Social Media Is a Critical 
Tool in Social Mobilization, but So Are the Traditional 
Mobilization Strategies........................................................................4 
3. Second School of Thought: The New Social Media Can Impact 
Social Mobilization; However, There Are Other Relative 
Factors That Come Into Play..............................................................6 
4. Third School of Thought: The New Social Media Has the 
Power to Revolutionize the Methods Political Activists Are 
Exploiting to Reach a Broad Audience Expeditiously......................8 
5. Possible Gaps in Literature.................................................................9 
6. Conclusion ..........................................................................................10 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES........................................................................10 
II. EGYPT’S AUTHORITARIAN REGIME: FROM NASSER TO THE 25 
JANUARY REVOLUTION......................................................................................13 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................13 
B. GAMAL ABDEL NASSER...........................................................................14 
C. ANWAR SADAT ...........................................................................................18 
D. HOSNI MUBARAK.......................................................................................22 
E. 25 JANUARY REVOLUTION.....................................................................29 
III. EXAMINING THE MAJOR FACTORS AND ELEMENTS THAT 
IMPACTED THE OUTCOME OF THE REVOLUTION....................................33 
A. UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNET AND THE NEW MEDIA IN 
EGYPT............................................................................................................33 
B. THE RISE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS INCREASED 
MOMENTUM TOWARDS PROTESTS, STRIKES, AND 
DEMONSTRATIONS ...................................................................................36 
C. 2010 SENSITIVE EVENTS INCREASED EMOTIONS AND 
ANGER TOWARDS A COMMON PURPOSE .........................................39 
1. “We are all Khaled Said”..................................................................39 
2. New Year’s Eve Alexandria Church Bombing ...............................41 
D. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY: TUNISIA THE CATALYST THAT 
EMPOWERED APOLITICAL EGYPTIANS TO RISE...........................43 
E. IMMEDIATE EFFORTS LEADING TO THE 25 JANUARY 
REVOLUTION ..............................................................................................45 
1. Planning and Training.......................................................................45 
 viii
2. Publicizing the First Day of the Revolution.....................................46 
3. Information Dissemination (Without the Internet) ........................48 
F. THE NEW MEDIA MEETS CONTENTIOUS POLITICS ......................49 
G. THE NEW MEDIA, AS A TOOL, HELPED SPREAD THE 
MESSAGE OF THE REVOLUTION..........................................................49 
1. Asmaa Mahfouz Video Blogs ............................................................49 
2. Facebook Groups ...............................................................................51 
H. THE NEW MEDIA GARNERED INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION 
TOWARDS EGYPT ......................................................................................52 
I. THE MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION........................................................56 
IV. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................57 
A. OWNERSHIP OF THE 25 JANUARY REVOLUTION...........................57 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH DESIGN ON THE NEW MEDIA........................58 
C. HYPOTHESES ANALYSIS .........................................................................60 
D. THE WAY AHEAD.......................................................................................61 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................65 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................71 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Egypt’s Population Growth Graph from 1950–2010.......................................23 
Figure 2. Egypt’s Youth Bulge........................................................................................29 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ASU  Arab Socialist Union  
 
IDSC  Information and Decision Support Center  
ISP Internet-Service Provider 
 
NAC  National Association for Change  
NPD  National Democratic Party  
 
OCR  Optical Character Recognition  
 
RCC  Revolutionary Command Council  
RNN  Rasd News Network  
 
UAR  United Arab Republic  
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I’m truly thankful to my advisors, Dr. Kadhim and Dr. Hafez, for their invaluable 
insights and guidance. I also would like to thank Allah for his grace, my parents, and my 
future husband Christopher Manning for their love and support throughout my graduate 
studies. 
 xiv




A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Under repressive authoritarian governments, the perceived impact of the new 
social media on contemporary revolutionary movements, more specifically on the Arab 
Spring, is that today’s revolutions require digital tools as these tools facilitate mass 
organizing, coordination, encourage demonstrations, and mobilization of groups while 
bypassing the traditional state control of the media. The aim of the thesis is to explore the 
role and impact, if any, of non-conventional media or the new social media (Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube, blogs, etc.) on sustained social mobilization and the outcome of the 25 
January 2011 Egyptian Revolution, hereafter known as the 25 January Revolution, that 
led to the ousting of former President Hosni Mubarak. The main research question is as 
follows. How did social media impact and/or effect the creation and mobilization of 
social movements against an authoritarian regime, as observed during the 25 January 
Revolution? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
In the light of the dramatic events of the 25 January Revolution, it is important to 
evaluate the impact of the new social media and its effect on the revolution and recognize 
how valuable it is becoming in the Middle East and North Africa under authoritarian 
regimes. The role of the social media in relevance to regime change has gained 
remarkable attention since the civil unrest that started in Tunisia and spread in various 
countries in the Middle East, including Egypt. The 25 January Revolution was the first 
major leaderless revolution where social media capabilities were highlighted as being 
influential in initiating and coordinating the protests because under authoritarian regimes, 
conventional media (radio, television, and print media) are heavily censored, monitored, 
and partially owned by the government. The government controls what people watch and 
read, and in many instances, fabricates the truth. Newspapers agencies in Egypt, for 
example, are heavily monitored by the Ministry of Information to eliminate any regime 
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criticism. The Egyptian Emergency Law also entitles the government to arrest citizens for 
any period of time and without the right to trial. Additionally, without permission from 
the government, any (five or more citizen) gatherings are illegal.1 Therefore, in fear of 
the Emergency Law and/or being incarcerated by security services, Egyptians are 
repressed and unable to express their social, economic and political frustrations, as well 
as human rights issues in a country characterized by a high unemployment rate, corrupt 
regime, poor economy, and extreme poverty.  
As the new social media was on the rise and became popular among the under 30 
youth population, the government was less successful in regulating and monitoring it; 
therefore, many saw an opportunity to break the fear barrier and voice their anger and 
concerns, while challenging the government at the same time; in other words, freedom of 
speech was found through the World Wide Web. What makes the social media unique 
when compared to conventional media, is its ability of instant communication/interaction, 
real time dissemination of information, free access to information, speedy reaction to 
events, affordability, and the ability to self publish.2 
Whether or not the new social media had an impact on the 25 January Revolution, 
it is still of importance to study it as it may ultimately have an impact on the Middle East. 
The civil unrest across the Middle East took the world by surprise possibly due to digital 
activism, and therefore, it is vital to study and understand the role and the possible impact 
of the new social media on revolutionary change. Studying, and closely monitoring, the 
new social media can turn into a valuable open source collection tool in an effort to 
understand the motivation of those who strive to create political change under repressive 
authoritarian governments. In addition, monitoring the new social media can offer 
analysis on why allied and antagonistic regimes may possibly re-strategize domestic and 
foreign policies (as they see fit) depending on whether or not the new social media 
threatens their rule.  
                                                 
1 Jijo Jacob, “What is Egypt’s April 6 Movement?” February 1, 2011, 
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/107387/20110201/what-is-egypt-s-april-6-movement.htm. 
2 Adel A. Sadek, “The Internet and Political Reform in Egypt,” Central for Political and Strategic 
Studies, July 15, 2007, http://acpss.ahram.org.eg/eng/ahram/2004/7/5/EGYP97.HTM. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis explores three possible explanations of the impact of the new social 
media on social mobilization and the outcome of the 25 January Revolution. The first 
hypothesis is the null hypothesis in which social media had no critical impact on 
sustained social mobilization and the outcome of the Egyptian Revolution. In other 
words, the first hypothesis states that the 25 January Revolution would have happened 
without the effects of social media. This hypothesis highlights that the desire for political 
reforms were present before the tweets, YouTube videos, and Facebook posts moved the 
situation to the world stage and propelled those forms of media into the spotlight.  
The second hypothesis is the antithesis of the first; it argues that social media was 
the most critical factor in achieving sustained social mobilization, and therefore, it was 
the most critical factor that affected the outcome of the revolution. This hypothesis argues 
that the new social media undoubtedly had the most critical and influential role in 
fomenting the revolution and the underlying support for reforms. The new social media 
was responsible for the revolution and was absolutely essential for the events to unfold as 
they did for the main reason that it allowed Egyptians to break the fear barrier and 
mobilize and protest under a repressive authoritarian government.  
The third hypothesis is the synthesis of the first two hypotheses. It posits that 
social media was a vital tool that enabled pre-existing networks to override state 
repressive measures; however, social media was only one of many tools (or factors) that 
smoothed the progress of social mobilization, and to some limited extent, had an impact 
on the outcome of the revolution. This hypothesis does not downplay completely the role 
of the new social media in facilitating the transmission of the message and mobilization 
of resources; however, the new social media is not a rationale for the revolution. The 
praiseworthy actions taken by the Egyptians in Tahrir Square and around the country 
were the key actors involved, not the various media tools available to spread the message. 
This hypothesis highlights that revolutions existed before the new social media, and 
therefore, the new social media was not a pillar of the revolution in and of itself.  
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One issue that the major research question can possibly raise is that now the world 
has witnessed the impact of popular unrest and how it led to revolution, is the future role 
of social media going to be in question, especially when social media are still currently 
evolving?  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
Current new social media studies introduce three different schools of thought on 
the new social media and its impact on contentious politics under authoritarian 
governments. However, before introducing the three different schools of thought, it is 
important to understand the role of the Internet. According to Andrew Chadwich, in 
Internet Politics: States, Citizens and New Communication Technologies, “The Internet is 
a network of networks of one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-many, and many-to-one 
local, national, and global information and communication technologies with relatively 
open standards and protocols and with comparatively low barriers to entry.”3 A telephone 
call is an example of a one-to-one communication media, while conventional broadcast 
media (such as television and radios) are one-to-many. The new social media can 
function as one-to-one, one-to-many, and most importantly, many-to-many means of 
communication.4  
2. First School of Thought: The New Social Media Is a Critical Tool in 
Social Mobilization, but So Are the Traditional Mobilization 
Strategies  
An ongoing debate exists on whether the new social media had the most impact, a 
significant impact, or no impact on bringing about political change and/or even toppling 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. The first school of thought argues that although 
some point out that the role of the social media had been overstated and exaggerated, they 
                                                 
3 Andrew Chadwish, Internet Politics: States, Citizens and New Communication Technologies (NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 7. 
4 Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations (London: 
Benguin Books, 2008), 86–87. 
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emphasize that the role of the new social media is a critical tool when used by citizens 
committed to bringing about political changes (democratization, reforms, etc.); however, 
traditional mobilization strategies cannot be disregarded.  
Rafat Ali, a social media expert and founder of PaidContent, stated that for the 
Egyptian Revolution, modern communication and technology had the most potent 
impact, especially Facebook and Twitter. Ali claimed, “Facebook definitely had a role in 
organizing this revolution, it acts like an accelerant to conditions which already exist in 
the country.”5 Like Ali, Philip Seib, in New Media and the New Middle East, illustrates 
in his arguments how the new media technologies in the Middle East are reshaping lives, 
as well as politics. Seib points out that the power of the Internet now allows Arab 
societies to participate in the political decision-making process, and therefore, citizens are 
“…able to plant the seeds for democracy and freedom and nourish its growth.”6  
The actual growth of communication over social media has not been a major 
concern for scholars; however, as a tool, its enabling power to create a sense of collective 
behavior that transforms to collective action, and therefore, may impact the outbreak of a 
civil unrest under an authoritarian regime, is. Emotional interaction occurring over social 
networks proves that relationships matter, and in turn, encourages citizens to come 
together and protest for a cause. According to Sidney Tarrow in Power in Movement: 
Social Movements and Contentious Politics, “The culture of collective action is built on 
frames and emotions oriented toward mobilizing people out of their compliance and into 
action in conflictual setting.”7  
Although the new social media can create a sense of collective behavior and 
action, it still cannot replace traditional social mobilization strategies, which is best 
illustrated during the 25 January Revolution when Egyptian authorities cut off Internet 
and telephone access in the midst of protesting for several days before restoring it. The 
                                                 
5 Sam Gustin, “Social Media Sparked, Accelerated Egypt’s Revolutionary Fire,” EPICENTER, 
February 11, 2011, www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/02/egypts-revolutionary -fire/. 
6 Philip Seib, New Media and the New Middle East (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 230. 
7 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. (NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 112.  
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disruption of the Internet and telephone lines hindered the government’s efforts to 
conduct damage control and stall the demonstrations; in fact, it encouraged traditional 
mobilization tactics and face-to-face communication, increased physical presence in the 
streets, and focal points locations transformed into various gatherings locations.8  
3. Second School of Thought: The New Social Media Can Impact Social 
Mobilization; However, There Are Other Relative Factors That Come 
Into Play  
Within the second school of thought, the common consensus in the literature is 
that social communication and revolutions are not a new phenomenon and it is inaccurate 
to state that social media causes revolution. As stated earlier, social media is a vital tool 
but tools alone are not responsible for revolutions; other contextual factors play a 
significant role that can impact social mobilization. To argue otherwise, is equivalent to 
saying that revolutions did not exist before social media; revolutions happened in the past 
before the existence of the Internet. For example, Aaron Ng stresses that social media is 
only a facilitator to revolutions just like “Pamphlets were used during the American 
Revolution in the eighteenth century, tape recorders in the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and 
fax machines during the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.”9 Like Ng, others stress it is 
inaccurate to allow the tools (social media) used by social activists to be the one praised, 
rather social activists should be defined and praised by their causes, not their tools.10 In 
other words, the people using the social media are responsible and accountable for the 
political change; the social media was not more than an enabling tool when political and 
social issues are bubbling underneath the surface.11  
                                                 
8 Navid Hassanpour, “Media Disruption Exacerbates Revolutionary Unrest: Evidence from Mubarak’s 
Natural Experiment” (paper presented at the American Political Science Association 2011 Annual Meeting, 
Washington, DC, August 7, 2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1903351&download=yes##.  
9 Aaron Ng, “Facebook and Twitter: New Hope of Revolution?” S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies Commentaries, no. 64/2011, April 27, 2011, 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0642011.pdf.  
10 Malcolm Gladwell, “Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted?” The New Yorker, 
October 4, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell. 
11 “Facebook’s Growth in the Arab World Is Surging with Demands for Political Change,” Managing 
Technology, February 23, 2011, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/arabic/article.cfm?articleid=2626.  
 7
In support of the conventional knowledge in literature that social media alone is 
ineffective in bringing about political change under an authoritarian regime, some argue 
that social media and/or new technologies can harm such efforts as authoritarian regimes, 
according to Professor of New Media, Clay Shirky, at New York University, are 
becoming better at controlling and silencing or suppressing the dissent.12 In authoritarian 
and semi-authoritarian regimes, governments are implementing methods to monitor, 
block, interdict certain websites and shape Internet usage. In China, for example, 
authorities block and filter certain websites, especially those of human rights 
organizations and/or politically sensitive foreign news media, while Cuba delimits access 
to the Internet. Similarly, in the Middle East, in countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates, specific censorship restrictions are implemented to prevent access 
to certain websites.13 From a different take, countries, such as Iran, can crack down on 
protestors from the Internet as they did after the Green Revolution collapsed. Iranian 
security forces were able to follow the trail the protestors left behind online in which it 
aided in their arrests, which is an example of how the Internet can become a “double-
edged sword” where technology can help and, at the same time, could harm those who 
use it.14 Another issue commonly emphasized with social media (when used as a tool to 
aid in social mobilization) is the phenomena of slacktivism. Slacktivism is simply 
supporting a cause online to make an individual feel as if a change or a difference is 
being made, when in reality, such mouse clicking amounts to little contribution in real 
life.15  
                                                 
12 Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political 
Change,” Foreign Affairs, February 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67038/clay-shirky/the-
political-power-of-social-media. 
13 Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, “The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: 
China, Cuba, and the Counterrevolution,” First Monday 6, no. 8 (2001): 23, 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/viewArticle/876/785. 
14 Ng, “Facebook and Twitter: New Hope of Revolution?”  




4. Third School of Thought: The New Social Media Has the Power to 
Revolutionize the Methods Political Activists Are Exploiting to Reach 
a Broad Audience Expeditiously  
The general consensus is that social media as a tool, when compared to censored 
conventional media, are unique in its ability of instant communication, interaction, real 
time dissemination of information, free access to information, speedy reaction to events, 
affordability, and the ability to self publish.16 Joseph Roberts, in How the Internet is 
Changing the Practice of Politics in the Middle East: Political Protest, New Social 
Movements and, Electronic Samizdat, calls attention to how social movements take full 
advantage of new media technologies to reach a broad audience, endorse and execute 
their agendas, while recruiting new members and raising funds if necessary.17 
To illustrate, Egyptians were not using the new social media to post pictures of 
recent vacations, generate status updates for their friends on the latest fashion trends, or 
follow celebrities on Twitter. They were utilizing the social media to tackle sensitive 
issues, such as corruption, unemployment, lack of fair and free elections, poverty, and 
human rights issues. Social media is not a new phenomenon prior to the 25 January 
Revolution; human rights activist were using the new social media to post videos of 
Egyptian police brutality and abuse. For example, a recent incident of police torture was 
the 2010 “We are all Khaled Said” movement that started as a Facebook page, after 
Egyptian businessman Khaled Said was brutality murdered by police forces for his 
attempt to try and expose corruption, and quickly transformed into a full anti-police 
brutality and abuse campaign.18 The “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook page was 
created by Wael Ghonim, the Google executive for the Middle East and North Africa, 
who although managed the page anonymously, was shortly detained by Egyptian 
                                                 
16 Sadek, “The Internet and Political Reform in Egypt.”  
17 Joseph W. Roberts, How the Internet Is Changing the Practice of Politics in the Middle East: 
Political Protest, New Social Movements, and Electronic Samizda (Edwin Mellen Press, 2009). 




authorities for 10 days prior to his release.19 With thousands of supporters, “We are all 
Khaled Said” highlighted the corrupt and abusive regime and broke the silence of many, 
while giving them the opportunity to detail out protests. Another example is that of the 
2008 April 6 Movement that generated over 70,000 supporters on Facebook in an effort 
to raise awareness of striking textile workers. As a result, on April 6, thousands of 
workers rioted, four citizens died, and 400 were arrested.20 Using the new social media, 
activists have been building their influence over the past few years to the degree that 
when Tunisian Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest against unemployment, 
his story was popular over the new social media and became the final straw that inspired 
the civil unrest in Egypt. These examples illustrate how the new social media 
revolutionized the methods political activists use to mobilize and seek maximum support 
for their cause.  
5. Possible Gaps in Literature 
Just like it is widely believed (and as mentioned earlier) that social media alone 
does not cause revolutions, overthrow dictators, or even cause civil unrest, a popular 
belief exists that social media is a threat to authoritarian regimes and such regimes are 
attempting to limit access to it. However, the role of the Internet, and more specifically, 
social media or other new technologies, in literature fail to address how it can undermine 
authoritarian rule. Some argue that scholarly work on the Internet and politics has been 
mainly focused on advanced democracies and not enough on authoritarian regimes. 
Empirical work conducted on social media (or other new technologies) and politics under 
authoritarian governments is rare as such tools are relatively new and will continue to 
evolve.21 In other words, and as Daniel Lynch argued, in After the Propaganda State: 
Media, Politics and ‘Thought Work’ in Reformed China, “on the question of 
                                                 
19 “Egypt’s Revolution by Social Media: Facebook and Twitter Let the People Keep Ahead of the 
Regime,” The Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703786804576137980252177072.html. 
20 “April 6 Youth Movement: How is Started?” February 22, 2011, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/revolution-in-cairo/inside-april6-movement/#. 
21 Kalathil and Boas, “The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba, and the 
Counterrevolution.”  
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telecommunications, the silence of the transitions literature is deafening.”22 It is 
important to note that opinions have been published, but a general absence of scholarly 
media content analysis on the new social media when compared to conventional media 
does exist.  
6. Conclusion 
Today’s information environment is extremely complex and currently evolving. 
No doubt exists that the flow of information over the Internet and the manner in which 
people communicate impacts politics; however, it only impacts politics to an extent. 
Among the three school of thoughts discussed earlier, the common consensus among all 
of them give importance to social media as a tool, and not a catalyst, to bring to light 
political frustrations, concerns, and issues in an effort to bring about political change 
under authoritarian governments. In this era of globalization and the diversity of the new 
Internet technologies, understanding the new social media is paramount for today’s 
political environment, especially the political environment under authoritarian regimes in 
the Middle East.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The author’s methodology was an in-depth case study analysis of the 25 January 
Revolution as social media was used extensively and may have impacted the dramatic 
events and the outcome of the revolution. The selected case examined the facts and 
analysis of the events.  
Conventional (newspapers) and non-conventional media sources (Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube, blogs, etc.), both in English and Arabic, were used as empirical data. 
The author also reviewed various primary, secondary and tertiary sources to include, but 
not limited to, media studies, journals for background on conventional and non-
conventional media, historical trends and media effects in the Arab world, public polling 
data/surveys, online open source reports, and interviews with media scholars and/or 
                                                 
22 Daniel C. Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics and ‘Thought Work’ in Reformed 
China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 227.  
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political figures on the subject. This research also focused on the role of the Internet, 
social networking group trend analysis, and youth opposition movements to analyze 
accurately the civil unrest events that occurred in the Middle East.  
 12
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 13
II. EGYPT’S AUTHORITARIAN REGIME: FROM NASSER TO 
THE 25 JANUARY REVOLUTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As the 2011 Tahrir Square revolutionary change took the world by surprise, many 
questioned why Egyptians did not rise up earlier against the regime’s inequities that had 
been building up over the decades. Alaa Al Aswany, in On the State of Egypt: What 
Made the Revolution Inevitable, illustrated the reason best as he stated, “Egyptians are an 
ancient people with a history stretching back seven thousand years and so, like old men, 
they have the wisdom to avoid problems insofar as they can while continuing to live and 
bring up their children. Only when they are certain that compromise is no longer possible 
they turn to revolution.”23 The 25 January Revolution did not just happen in a vacuum; 
since the 1952 Free Officers Revolution, conditions in Egypt dating back decades during 
the Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak’s years all contributed to the 
25 January Revolution. During the last 60 years, Egypt was trapped in a state of 
authoritarianism that ultimately led to dependence on state repression, single-party 
hegemony, and economic cronyism. The aim of this chapter is to cover a brief history of 
the Egyptian authoritarian regime up to the detailed events of the 25 January Revolution. 
This chapter highlights specific events, policies, and reforms implemented under Nasser, 
Sadat, and Mubarak, with special emphasis on the main elements (state repression, single 
party hegemony, crony capitalism, the over exaggeration of militant Islamism, and peace 
with Israel) that empowered Mubarak to stay in power for three decades all under the 
false impression of civic order and political stability.  
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B. GAMAL ABDEL NASSER 
Gamal Abdel Nasser was the leader of a small group of army officers, who were 
united by patriotism, called themselves the Free Officers and were actively plotting to 
overthrow the corrupt and British influenced monarchy in Egypt in 1952. The 1952 
Revolution abolished the Egyptian monarchy and marked the beginning of Gamal Abdel 
Nasser to power. As Egypt was declared a republic, Nasser became the “soft-hearted”24 
engaged and independent authoritarian leader from 1954 until his death in 1970. During 
that period, Nasser was the president of Egypt and also the leader of the Arab world. 
Highly engaged in Arab affairs, his influence on other Arab states was so powerful that 
the term Nasserism was linked to a common political reference of pan-Arab nationalism, 
anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism, as well as socialism.25 In fact, Nasser overtly 
emphasized Arabism and Pan-Arab unity in his 1956 constitution as it stated that Egypt is 
an Arab country within an Arab nation.26 Nasser presidential years and institutional 
legacy are marked with various significant events, policies, and reforms that shaped 
Egypt on what is it is today.  
Nasser initial efforts were to end the British occupation in Egypt, establish 
institutions and social reforms, eliminate feudalism, and formulate a strong army. Nasser 
led the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to serve as the executive body of the 
government with the intention to respond to situations as they rose. The RCC gained 
legitimacy as it introduced the Agrarian Reform Law that stripped the Egyptian 
aristocracy from its land, along with the laws that abolished all civil or Turkish titles 
(pasha, bey), and the introduction of the new constitution. The political system during 
Nasser’s rule aimed at guiding the popular will; candidates of the national assembly were 
nominated and screened while decision-making authority was centralized giving 
maximum powers to the president. Nasser generated the legacy of a single-party regime, 
which basically became the hegemonic party system and gave maximum powers to the 
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president. Although Sadat and Mubarak opened up the system to a multi-party pluralism, 
the single party system still remained a hegemonic party system. Additionally, Nasser 
empowered the military to the degree that it became a critical institution in Egypt’s 
polity.27  
As a result, every president after Nasser came from a military background and 
state repression became a standard operating procedure through the empowerment of the 
military and security institutions. For example, after the emergency law (Law 162 of 
1958) was enacted, Nasser became obsessed with the media most likely because he 
conquered the Arab world through the radio. He placed heavy censorship on the media, 
as well as restrictions on union activities and political organizations.28 Nasser also had a 
secret police, intelligence services, political spies within the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), 
and political prisoners (members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Communists) who were 
beaten and tortured. In addition, Nasser’s nationalist status excluded Islam from its 
political agenda, hence his emphasis on a secular Arab nation and the crackdown on the 
Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the evident role that Egyptian Christians played in public 
life. To an extent, Nasser institutionalized state repression through torture and political 
coercion and over-exaggerated the threat from militant Islamism (i.e., members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood), that later positioned Sadat and Mubarak to fear and repress them 
at varying degrees.29  
The Egyptian industry was underdeveloped and the slow paced industrialization 
was the result of low levels of public and private investment and population growth that 
outnumbered the rate of employment billets, and therefore, affecting the standard of 
living. The solution to such problems was the creation of a hydroelectric dam on the Nile 
near Aswan, later known as the Aswan High Dam. The Aswan High Dam, a brilliant 
invention that would politically increase the government’s prestige, had economic 
advantages, as it would store enough water to expand land cultivation and generate 
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enough hydroelectric supply for the whole country. However, the project required funds 
that the Egyptians simply did not possess at the time without engaging with the 
international community.30 Without compromising Egypt’s sovereignty, the assertive 
Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 to take the revenues from 
the canal and fund the Aswan High Dam project. The Western powers reaction of the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal was labeled as hostile as Nasser relieved the French and 
the British from having any control over the Suez Canal. As a result, Britain, France, and 
Israel generated a joint agreement (the Tripartite Aggression) to attack Egypt but fell 
short of complete execution as the United States and the Soviet Union intervened. In turn, 
the weeklong conflict of the Suez crisis transformed from a military defeat to a political 
triumph for Nasser and Egypt.31  
Such triumph placed Nasser in the spotlight as a heroic Arab leader, a status that 
was a burden, as well as an opportunity for Nasser. His success and prestige were built on 
his perceived courage to stand in the face of the former imperial powers, and to maintain 
his prestige, he felt that he had no choice other than to continue with his foreign policy 
successes that many Arabs expected of him. The creation of the United Arab Republic 
(UAR) in 1958 symbolized just that, an Arab unity, while the collapse of the UAR was a 
negative hit on Nasser’s prestige that somewhat forced him to reassess his goals. 
Following the collapse of the UAR, Nasser adopted Arab socialism, which included 
reforms in egalitarianism and social warfare.32  
Throughout the post-Suez decade, Egypt’s dominant Arab nationalist role 
disseminated its influence throughout the Arab world as Egypt supported the Algerian 
Revolution and the Yemeni revolutionary forces against the monarchy. Additionally, 
Egypt became the ideal model and inspiration that rebel movements mimicked 
throughout the Gulf.33 Although the Egyptian economy, job security, and educational 
opportunities were improving under Nasser during the 1950s and 1960s, Nasser’s active 
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engagement with the Arab states and foreign policy can still be criticized in diverting his 
attention away from domestic issues, proper management, and oversight of his 
government. The defeat of 1967 Six Day War was the apparent result of such criticism 
that questioned Nasser’s achievements. 
The aftermath of the Israeli 1967 June war was a humiliating event for Nasser and 
the Arab world and, without question, marked the end of the Nasser era. Years later 
Nasser’s successor, Sadat, stated that Nasser did not die in 1970 but symbolically died on 
the first day of the 1967 war.34 Although Nasser was a dictator, he was an honest dictator 
with a corrupt and mismanaged military; he trusted his military leaders who were 
incompetent. Due to the outcome of the war, Nasser announced his resignation that loyal 
Egyptians refused to accept, and therefore, brought back their hero to govern a country to 
which he gave structure, a feeling of pride, and a sense of excitement and hope for a 
better tomorrow. Unfortunately, the defeat of the 1967 war weakened the Nasser era as 
Nasser shifted his focus on political survival and somewhat abandoned his policies that 
defined Nasserism. The aftermath of the war can be characterized by the increased Soviet 
Union influence on Egyptian military, the Egyptian-Israeli war of attrition, the 
acceptance of the UN Resolution 242, and the apparent distance of the Arab unity 
quest.35  
Although Egyptians were poor in the early 1950s and stayed poor throughout the 
end of the 1960s, Nasser offered hope for a better future through his agricultural reform, 
free education, minimum wages, and employment guarantee for college graduates.36 
However, accusations against Nasser were beyond economic reforms. Some of the issues 
that proved lacking in the aftermath of the 1967 war were the public sector. The public 
sector adopted a “…Soviet-style system of sterile thinking, a deathbed for talent, a site of 
mediocre resource allocation, inefficiency, suffocating bureaucracy, waste and decrepit 
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management; in no way could it support lasting economic development in the country.”37 
Some can argue that land reform, for example, replaced capitalized large landowners with 
low-skilled individuals who produced low quality products, affected the marketing 
management of crops, and therefore, established poor links to the international markets. 
Going beyond economic mismanagement, Nasser created a military bureaucratic system 
that may have stood in the road of democracy as he failed to transfer his aspirations into 
institutions, and more importantly, into a state. The failure to define a state occurred as all 
of Nasser’s projects and reforms identified and revolved around him whether it was 
intentional or not; without Nasser, changes, such as the Arab nationalist identity and 
foreign policies, etc., could not survive. Although Nasser’s projects became the 
foundation of the Egyptian government and authority, they failed to evolve into proper 
institutions, and such failure became evident as Nasser’s successors steered Egypt away 
from Socialism and revised its strategic agenda.38  
Understanding the nature of Nasser’s years in power is critical as it can shed light 
on what eventually led to the 25 January Revolution that took the world, and even 
Egyptians, by surprise. With that said, it is of importance to note that Nasser did not 
devote enough time towards domestic issues nor proper oversight of his leadership. 
Instead, his institutional legacy consisted of state repression through the empowerment of 
the military and security institutions. Additionally, he created a hegemonic single-party 
regime; and therefore, halted any potential progress towards democracy. Although Sadat 
and Mubarak somewhat entertained the idea of including the Muslim Brotherhood in 
politics, the exclusion of Islamism was Nasser’s legacy and continued with Sadat and 
Mubarak; both feared and repressed them and may have even over-exaggerated their 
threat.  
C. ANWAR SADAT 
Anwar Sadat, Nasser’s successor who initially had no popularity and insignificant 
number of supporters, came to power with efforts to steer Egypt away from Nasserism. 
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Sadat’s efforts “…abolished Nasser’s socialism; altered Egypt’s strategic orientation 
from Arab nationalism and a close friendship with the USSR to an alliance with the 
United States; shunned progressive revolutionism and joined Saudi-led Arab 
conservatism; diluted the public sector in favour of resurgent capitalism; and reversed the 
regime’s relationship with the people.”39  
Sadat inherited Nasser’s economic and diplomatic problems. For example, the 
years post the 1967 defeat were years of no war and a no peace situation with Israel, 
which in turn, took a negative toll on the Egyptian economy (tourism, Suez Canal, and 
foreign investment). Sadat assessed that to influence Israel in a way that could favor 
Egypt, he must distance his alliance with the Soviet Union. Therefore, he dismissed 
approximately 20,000 Soviet military members from Egypt in 1972. The next step was to 
show the United States that the Israeli military was not as powerful as the United States 
assumed it was in an effort to have the United States enter a negotiating process. The 
result was the October 1973 war considered a strategic victory for Egypt and a political 
triumph for Sadat as Egyptians launched an initial attack on the Israeli forces on the east 
bank of the Suez Canal and succeeded in crossing the canal. The sudden attack on 
October 1973 later labeled Sadat as the “Hero of the Crossing.” 40 The next step for the 
“hero” was to tackle the economy.  
Sadat’s economic project, al-Infitah or “the opening,” deviated from Nasser’s 
socialism and towards promoting foreign investments, the private sector, and the 
integration with the international community. However, with foreign debt, high inflation 
rate and defense budget, only the wealthy benefited from al-Infitah.41 The system was 
flawed as the regime used al-Infitah to “…build its own power base, to reward its cronies 
and allies and to create a capitalist class whose loyalties were not to free markets and 
open economies – and certainly not to democracy – but rather to the regime itself.”42 Al-
Infitah strengthened the private sector, and as a result, the private sector became a 
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significant economic actor in Egypt; Sadat and his regime quickly aligned with the 
wealthy while neglecting the poor.43 As a result, Sadat opened up the political system to 
crony capitalism, which persisted after his death.  
Unlike Nasser who lived and died in the same house that he had before the 
revolution,44 Sadat enjoyed presidential perks. For example, villas, mansions, and a 
special presidential office in an old royal palace in Cairo identified Sadat as similar to the 
corrupt Faruq II or the khedive. Sadat’s high styles of living, along with his association 
with the Western image and his wife’s public role, were factors that most certainly 
contributed to his unpopularity among the Egyptian population,45 and his failure to 
identify with them. Nasser, on the other hand, lived a moderate life along with his wife 
without the extravagances that Sadat and his wife possessed; and therefore, the majority 
of the Egyptian population was able to identify with him and perceive him as one of 
them.  
The “Hero of the Crossing” lifted some restrictions on the press and the Muslim 
Brotherhood; however, criticism of the government, the military, and the president and 
his family remained off limits. Sadat also ended the ASU and replaced it with the 
National Democratic Party (NPD), and placed Law 40 as a mean to keep unwanted 
political groups away from his political area of responsibility. Of note, Law 40 (amended 
in 2005) played a critical role in Egyptian politics up until the 25 January Revolution that 
brought down the regime.46 Sadat’s failed efforts to improve the country gave him no 
other choice but to arrange with a settlement with the Israelis in hopes of improving the 
Egyptian economy. Shortly after the riots that broke out in response to the increase in 
subsidies, the world tuned in to watch Sadat as he made his way to Jerusalem to 
announce peace with Israel publicly. Less than a year later, Sadat signed the Camp David 
Accords on September 17, 1978. The Egyptian population was not at ease with the Camp 
David Accords Israeli agreement that Sadat committed Egypt to for the reason that Israel 
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continued to occupy other Arab territory (the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East 
Jerusalem). In addition, Egyptian bitterness increased as Egypt was perceived as 
becoming distant from the Islamic Arab world and closer to the West (the United States). 
Sadat, also known as the “man of peace,” became characterized as the one who supported 
peace with Israel and becoming close to the West, which Mubarak adopted from Sadat 
and continued while in power.47  
Like Nasser’s socialist approach that failed to prevent the 1967 defeat, Sadat’s 
capitalist approach failed to improve the economy and did not produce perceptible 
improvements. Ironically enough, since Sadat lessened the restrictions on the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s activities, an Islamic militant group that opposed his policies, his backing 
of the exiled Shah of Iran, and Egypt’s relationship with Israel and the United States, 
assassinated him on October 6, 1981. It is important to note that active Islamic militant 
groups increased since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.48 A month before his assassination, 
Sadat became aware of the rise of the dangerous clandestine Islamic groups (al- Jihad and 
al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah) against his regime, and therefore, he ordered the arrest and 
imprisonment of over 1,000 suspects. Such militant Islamic groups were educated 
individuals and the product of “…a mixture of religious belief, social despair, and 
economic deprivation.”49 Mubarak also adopted Sadat’s pattern of inclusion and then 
exclusion of Islamists. Although Sadat had dramatic shifts in foreign and internal 
economic policies, he, however, did not alter the political state of authoritarianism that 
Nasser had set; the single party hegemony and the role of the military and security 
institutions remained forceful, and therefore, allowed room for state repression and 
economic cronyism.  
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D. HOSNI MUBARAK 
Hosni Mubarak, Sadat’s successor, was sworn into office on October 14, 1981 
before the People’s Assembly and had a promising start. Mubarak’s impressive military 
background and reputation as the commander of the Air Force, and later as a vice 
president, earned him the respect of the people. Mubarak’s first speech to parliament was 
a positive indicator towards Egypt’s future as he reached out to the opposition and also as 
he stated to use the emergency law in a limited manner. Mubarak’s challenges in the 
1980s and early 1990s were economically based (external debt, significant 
unemployment, and a growing population50).51 During his first term, Mubarak focused 
heavily on domestic issues; he freed thousands of prisoners, eased censorship on the press 
and the professional syndicates, and appeared to guide Egypt toward a democratic 
political system (open elections of 1984). However, Mubarak’s intentions were a clever 
tactic in an effort to appear as if he was actively trying to lead the country towards a 
democratic setting; however, he was only trying to contain a tense country. In other 
words, the players that such reforms could be applicable to were actually agents 
controlled by the government; and therefore, such players (or agents) never evolved into 
actual opposition groups or groups that insisted on change. Furthermore, Mubarak 
expanded the national security forces (Mabaheth-Amn-A-Dolah), the central security 
(containment forces) apparatus, and only trusted his security chiefs, as well as the heads 
of his intelligence services.52 By the fourth presidential oath and during his first 20 years 
in office, it was clear that Mubarak became the “Pharaoh” of Egypt; his “…economic 
reform became crony capitalism, political change was fortifying the authoritarian system 
under the guise of reform, and presidential succession that meant a potential inheritance 
of power.”53  
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Figure 1.   Egypt’s Population Growth Graph from 1950–2010 
Corruption existed under Nasser and Sadat; however, both leaders showed 
progress through major projects in hopes of improving Egypt and the lives of Egyptians. 
Mubarak, on the contrary, had no major project to drive him forward, and therefore, 
corruption became an institutionalized system that led him to hold on to power for nearly 
30 years. With Nasser and Sadat, Egyptians were willing to tolerate a level of corruption 
as long as the country was moving forward and improving the lives for the majority. With 
Mubarak, the corruption persisted with no resulting benefit for the people or 
advancement of the Egyptian society. Mubarak’s first prime minister was the last 
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qualified minister to assume duties and responsibilities of such position. All ministers 
that proceeded after him obtained their positions through presidential ties or networks, 
and primarily in favor of their self-interest. Additionally, their entire political future 
depended on their relationship with the president; they all had to praise his 
accomplishments, never dare to disagree with him on any matter, and of course, be 
willing to cooperate with his security agencies. With that said, it was only natural for 
such unqualified and selfish ministers to build and be surrounded by corrupt staffs only 
concerned with their self-interest.54  
Corruption welcomed rigged elections. Although the Egyptian legal/judicial 
system is an independent branch of the government, as per the constitution, responsible 
for supervision duties during the presidential and parliamentary elections, it is in fact 
ironically embedded in the executive branch. The president is the chief executive and has 
excessive powers and overall influence over the judicial branch by appointing judges. 
Under articles 170 and 171, the constitution allows citizens to participate in establishing 
justice; however, and according to Fahmy in The Politics of Egypt: State-Society 
Relationship, “…since the President is the representative of the nation, he can in his 
capacity interfere in the course of justice.”55 The regime attempted to use judges to mask 
elections rigging in the past; however, judges refused to support the government’s fraud. 
The regime then depended on the Ministry of Interior to execute orders for rigging the 
elections to favor Mubarak. As soon as the president conveys to the interior minister to 
fabricate the elections’ result, the message is then passed to the police officers and civil 
servants to execute the orders by preventing citizens from voting and/or calling in thugs 
to harm those brave citizens who do attempt to vote or those who do not belong to the 
ruling party. From there, unfilled ballots are filled in and the fabricated results are 
announced to favor Mubarak as originally planned.56 Untimely, over the years, Egyptians 
boycotted the elections, as they knew in advance that the elections were going to be  
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rigged. A famous quote by Josef Stalin summarizes Mubarak’s election rigging process, 
“The people who cast the votes do not decide an election, the people who count the votes 
do.”57 
Corruption became a way of life. At a high level, for example, numerous loans 
were granted without collateral by state banks to people who have or were associated 
with seats of power, many of whom vanished without making payments. At a lower and 
middle level, population growth and unemployment has led many to break the law to 
avoid a life in the slums of Egypt and provide for their families. Bribes, in all amounts, 
were expected and overtime, were factored into one’s monthly salary.58 Corruption from 
the top generated difficult economic conditions, which motivated many writers, activists, 
and bloggers to expose the regime. However, Mubarak continued to use terrorism as an 
excuse to continue using the emergency law, and through such law, crackdowns on the 
media and new media became the norm.  
During Mubarak’s early years of presidency, the press enjoyed a short period of 
freedom of expression; sadly, such freedom did not last for long. The government then 
began to control what journalists published, and therefore, controlled what people read. 
Conventional media (radio, television, and print media) were heavily censored, 
monitored, and partially owned by the government. Newspapers agencies in Egypt, for 
example, were heavily monitored by the Ministry of Information to eliminate any regime 
criticism. Despite such strict censorship regulations, the government still failed to silence 
the brave ones who broke the silence or the fear barrier; such individuals of course paid a 
heavy price. The government managed to shut down newspapers entirely, arrest 
journalists and/or editor-in-chiefs, or even go as far as torture, beatings, and sexual 
assaults.59 Especially during sensitive events, such as parliamentary elections, the 
government tightly controlled what was published and restricted anything other than 
positive coverage on government activities to the point that even privately owned satellite 
stations were not exempt from such regulation. For instance, a 12-year-old popular talk 
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show “Cairo Today,” broadcasted over private television networks, was shut down after 
its politically outspoken editor Ibrahim Eissa was relieved of his duties.60 Although the 
Egyptian Minister of Information denied the talk show’s association to political 
dimension, the closure of the talk show was during the same period of parliamentary 
elections.61 
Activists and journalists who opposed and questioned the regime during the late 
Mubarak period also became victims of threats, imprisonment, and assaults. For example, 
2006 was not a good year for the Egyptian blogosphere as authorities arrested 
approximately 100 bloggers and online activists, including award-winning blogger 
Ahmad Said al Islam. One of the bloggers arrested was blogger Mohammed el Sharkawi 
who was tortured and raped in custody. Many arrests were based on affiliation and 
membership to the Muslim Brotherhood, supposedly disrupting Egypt’s reputation, 
spreading false information, demonstration organizing, criticizing Islam, etc. To the 
regime, such activists were breaking an informal political rule, and therefore, harassment, 
intimidation, and arrests were justified. Journalists were not the only ones threatened with 
prosecution; reporters also received a fair share of harassment, threats, and abuse. For 
example, in 2008, various opposition media dailies reported on Mubarak’s deteriorating 
health and were later accused of publishing false information. Accusations against the 
editors were eventually dropped but they were, nevertheless, required to pay a fine 
because in the eyes of the regime, the editors were violating the informal rules of the 
political game. 62  
Unlike Nasser and Sadat, Mubarak managed to stay in power for nearly 30 years 
without naming a vice president. It was only during the 25 January revolutionary events 
that Mubarak finally named a vice president as he struggled to regain control of his 
country. Mubarak avoided naming a vice president over the years because he was 
grooming young Gamal Mubarak (his son) to succeed him. Although Gamal never 
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indicated he was interested in becoming his father’s successor, he also never denied it 
either. During the late 1990s, it was evident that young Mubarak was on the road of 
succession as he became a public figure in the Egyptian state-run media. Assuming a 
leadership position in the NDP, Gamal positioned himself on the right road to presidency. 
Additionally, it appeared as if the 2007 constitution amendment to Article 76 was tailored 
towards making Gamal the next Egyptian president. Furthermore, frequent on-the-job-
training was another factor that made the succession from Hosni Mubarak to Gamal 
Mubarak most likely; Gamal accompanied his father on multiple official trips to 
Washington, made annual performances at the World Economic Forum in Davos, and 
made frequent official visits to foreign capitals under the disguise of “personal” 
business.63  
Accusations were leveled against the young Mubarak blaming him for Egypt’s 
deteriorating state, but he was also given credit for reviving the economy since he was his 
father’s political advisor when it came to creating the “new Egypt.” Along with the help 
of his son or unofficial advisor, Hosni Mubarak created the “new Egypt” with the 
shopping centers, malls, gated communities, resorts, and “alleged” political progress that 
only catered to a minority of people. The majority of Egyptians could not afford high end 
products and luxuries on the wages they were earning from their full time jobs. In fact, 
over 16 million Egyptians were living under two dollars a day.64 Due to such harsh 
conditions, Egyptians rejected the idea of succession; why would any Egyptian desire the 
return of a monarchial regime? In addition, the young Mubarak has no military 
background or enough political talent to resume such position. Gamal may be educated, 
but over 40 million Egyptians are educated, have graduate degrees, and are far more 
qualified that Gamal could ever be. However, it is important to note that the regime has 
always used the Muslim Brotherhood as a “bogeyman” to convince Egyptians, along with 
the West, that succession is best for all.65  
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The Egyptian under-30 disgruntled youth population accounts for approximately 
60 percent of Egypt’s population.66 Since 1990, Egypt’s unemployment rate increased 
gradually leaving many unemployed, living in poverty, vulnerable to committing crime, 
and hopeless. Over eight million desperate Egyptians (which accounted for over 10 
percent of the population) applied for the American green-card lottery to flee their 
devastating economic conditions. Additionally, about half a million Egyptians entered 
Europe as illegal immigrants in the 2000s.67 Many educated Egyptians would rather work 
for minimum wages in a foreign country and risk their lives getting there over staying in 
their homeland and living under poverty, corruption, oppression, and constant 
humiliation. Such frustrations, grievances and resentment allowed social movements, 
such as Kefaya! (“Enough!”) that opposed the forced blood succession from Hosni 
Mubarak to Gamal Mubarak or the April 6 movement that used social media in 2008 to 
mobilize for labor strikes or even the “We are All Khaled Said” Facebook group that 
aimed to expose police brutality, to break the fear barrier and confront the regime.  
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Figure 2.   Egypt’s Youth Bulge  
Aside from the fact that Egypt’s last three presidents were all dictators, shared a 
military background, and ruled Egypt using coercion, they all represented themselves 
differently. Nasser was the coup leader to the Egyptian hero, Sadat was the “Hero of the 
Crossing,” and finally, Mubarak as the corrupt and stubborn dictator whose 30 years of 
rule brought about Egypt’s most recent revolution and ousted him from power.  
E. 25 JANUARY REVOLUTION 
On January 25, 2011, the commemoration of Egypt’s national Police Day, 
thousands of Egyptians stormed in the streets demanding the resignation of Hosni 
Mubarak. Opposition groups initially planned to protest on January 25 in front of the 
Ministry of Interior against police brutality and to demand the abolishment of the 
emergency law. It is of importance to note that Police Day was intended, as Mubarak 
stated in 2004, to be “a valuable symbol of patriotism and sacrifice,” and a day on which 
Egyptians can have an opportunity to express their appreciation, as well as pride for the 
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police forces. Instead, January 25, 2011 was not a date to commemorate the police; 
instead, it was the “Day of Rage.” Timing for the revolution was everything; the planned 
demonstration was only 11 days after the Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was 
overthrown.68 The non-violent protests ended up occurring near locations of the NDP, the 
foreign ministry, state television, as well as other locations throughout the country. Tahrir 
Square, however, became the symbolic center for the protests. Aljazeera stated that the 
protest organizers heavily depended on social media to mobilize and communicate. There 
were also reports of casualties. The Ministry of Interior initially tied the Muslim 
Brotherhood as the creators of the “Day of Rage,” a claim that the Muslim Brotherhood 
denied.69  
The following day, the regime fought back by shutting down the Internet and 
ordered police forces to break up the crowds and force them off the streets. It is 
significant to note that the demonstrators consisted of a large number of educated men 
and women of all classes, Muslims and Copts, and all ages were chanting secular anti-
Mubarak slogans demanding political freedom and human dignity.70 At that point, 
violence broke out between the police and the demonstrators; casualties increased and 
three people were reported dead. Over the next few days, phone text messaging, along 
with the Internet, were disabled, protests continued, violence erupted, many were 
arrested, and opposition leader and former member of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, returned to Cairo to join the protests. January 28 became 
the “Friday of Rage” as the government ordered the military to assist the police forces; 
however, the military did not interfere with the police and the demonstrators’ 
confrontations. By Friday, “Friday of Rage,” 11 were reported dead and over 1,000 
injured throughout the country.71  
                                                 
68 Cook, The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square, 281–282. 
69 “Timeline: Egypt’s Revolution,” Aljazeera, February 14, 2011, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html.  
70 Amin, Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak 1981–2011, 1. 
71 “Timeline: Egypt’s Revolution.”  
 31
By January 29, Mubarak addressed the nation live on television to announce his 
decision to dismiss his cabinet and appointed a vice president (Omar Suleiman) for the 
first time in nearly 30 years; however, Mubarak refused to resign and imposed a curfew. 
Within one week since January 25, the protesting continued and the protestors remained 
grounded in Tahrir Square, broke curfew, and continued to call on Mubarak to step down. 
By February 1, Mubarak made a second live television appearance claiming not to run for 
another term in elections, promised political reforms, and economic improvement. Still, 
Mubarak refused to step down. The number of protestors at Tahrir Square increased to 
over one million Egyptians, while thousands more took to the streets of Egypt throughout 
the country. Clashes between anti-Mubarak and pro-Mubarak broke out that night. By 
February 5, the NPD leaders resigned (including Gamal Mubarak), the military remained 
deployed with its tanks, the Internet and telephone lines partially restored; however, the 
violence continued. The United Nations reported that 300 personnel might have been 
killed since the protesting begun.72  
By February 7 and 8, Tahrir Square looked like a tented campsite as protestors 
camped out. By February 7, banks had reopened for business but school and other 
institutions remained closed.73 In addition, state authorities released Wael Ghonim, the 
Google executive, political activist, and creator of the “We Are All Khaled Said” 
Facebook page. On the evening of his release, Ghonim appeared on Dream (a privately 
owned Egyptian channel) to give a heart-felt, moving interview. A day after Ghonim’s 
televised interview, Egypt witnessed the largest number to date of protestors in Tahrir 
Sqaure, including those that returned from abroad to join the uprising, as well as 
supporters of Ghonim.74 
By February 9, labor unions joined the protestors along with many other average 
citizens (accompanied by their children) who joined the Tahrir Square protesting. The 
Human Rights Watch reported 302 Egyptians had been killed since January 25. On 
February 10, many assessed that Mubarak would finally step down; however, his 
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televised speech indicated otherwise. He was not going to resign and Egyptians were 
enraged; the demonstrations intensified with anger and frustration to the point that the 
uprising reached a nationwide level. By six p.m. on February 11, Vice President 
Suleiman appeared on television to announce the following:  
Citizens, in these difficult circumstances the country is going through, the 
President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak had decided to leave his position as 
the president of the Republic, and had entrusted the Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces to administer the nation’s affair. 
In 18 days, the 83-year-old Hosni Mubarak’s nearly 30 years of power officially ended.75  
                                                 
75 Cook, The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square, 292–295. 
 33
III. EXAMINING THE MAJOR FACTORS AND ELEMENTS 
THAT IMPACTED THE OUTCOME OF THE REVOLUTION  
A. UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNET AND THE NEW MEDIA IN EGYPT 
The Egyptian Universities Network and the Egyptian cabinet’s Information and 
Decision Support Center (IDSC) first introduced the Internet in Egypt in 1993; however, 
the general public did not gain access until 1995. More specifically, Internet access did 
not become easily accessible and affordable until Egypt’s Ministry of Communication 
and Information Technology launched the Free Internet Initiative in 2002. The Free 
Internet Initiative allowed any Egyptian with a computer and a telephone line to access 
the Internet for US$0.15 an hour. Today, with an approximate Egyptian population of 
80.4 million, Internet penetration accounts for only 24 percent, which is a significant 
increase from 0.58 percent in 1999. Internet-service providers (ISPs) that serve Egypt’s 
entire population number 214; 70 percent of the Internet’s bandwidth is owned by TE 
Data ISP, a stated owned landline.76  
With a 67 percent penetration rate, mobile telephone subscribers have grown to 
55.3 million. Vodafone, Mobinil, and Etisalat are the three mobile telephone operators in 
Egypt that also offer Internet connections via USB modems.77 Smartphones, or camera 
mobile telephones, are increasingly becoming popular due to their ability to access the 
Internet. In fact, social media applications are accessed through Smartphones 
(BlackBerry, iPhone, Android) and other hand-carried devices, such as an iPad. In 
addition, 70 percent of mobile Internet users are mobile only. Falling PC costs, the 
penetration of Smartphones, and the increased availability of the Internet in cafes, work 
spaces, etc., made Egypt the second largest country of Internet users after Nigeria.78  
                                                 
76 “Freedom on the Net 2011: Egypt,” Freedom House, April 18, 2011, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/FotN/Egypt2011.pdf. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Mark Alexander Shalaby, “Mobile Internet in Egypt: the Hope and the Hype,” May 2011, 
http://www.partager-le-savoir.org/template/fs/malte2011/presentations/shalaby_malta.pdf. 
 34
Ironically, under Egypt’s authoritarian regime, no laws regulate Internet use and 
censorship; in fact, Egypt’s constitution, along with the 2003 Law of 
Telecommunications, protects citizens’ privacy, freedom of speech, and restricts 
surveillance without a proper judicial warrant. In the past, attempts were made to ban 
certain websites. For example, in 2007, a judge ruled against banning 51 Egyptian 
websites, including many associated with human rights organizations, in an effort to 
emphasize the importance of the Internet’s freedom of expression.79 Nevertheless, the 
Egyptian Emergency Law gave the government room to repress Internet activism by 
employing non-technology methods of intimidation, harassment, arrests, torture, and 
detentions.80  
Over the last few years, Egypt witnessed a remarkable increase of online activism 
and a diverse blogosphere. Many online activists and bloggers became outspoken and 
overtly discussed sensitive topics to relieve their social, economic and political 
frustrations. By 2008, over 160,000 blogs helped increase the diversity of the content and 
opinions online. By 2010, the common goal of many online activists and bloggers 
became political change. Additionally, the increase of social media networking websites 
(Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Blogs, etc.) over the last few years generated a new 
culture, which also supported online activism.81  
Although social media networking websites became popular in 2007, they have 
been around since the late 1990s. The evolution of social media helped Egyptians connect 
and engage one another. Social media platforms are characterized by allowing one to 
blog, network, and video share.82 The nature of each web-based social media site can 
vary. However, generally speaking, social media networking sites can be defined in terms 
of allowing one to “(1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, 
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(2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and 
traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system.”83 This 
thesis focuses on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube as they became the most commonly 
used social media networking sites by the Egyptian under 30 youth population. It is 
important to note that the younger (under 30 years of age) population accounts for 60 
percent of Egypt’s population.84  
After Turkey, Egypt’s Facebook users comprised the second largest number in the 
Middle East and North Africa with more than five million users.85 Facebook evolved 
among the youth population in Egypt, as it became the social website of choice to the 
extent that “Facebooking” became a commonly used verb. Facebook, as a social network 
site, works because it is private and it allows control of the living social circle on a digital 
platform. Users are able to add others as friends, post and share information (including 
videos and photos), comment, chat, exchange messages, as well as join common interest 
groups. Twitter, on the contrary, evolved among the youth population because it is 
public. Twitter is a micro-blogging social network site that allows users to generate no 
more than 140 characters (or tweets) in a personalized message through a newsfeed on 
the site.86 Twitter has more than 200 million users worldwide; however, Egypt only had 
(at the time of the 25 January Revolution) approximately 20,000 subscribers (equivalent 
to one percent of the globe’s users).87 Similarly, YouTube is a video sharing website that 
allows the uploading, sharing, and viewing of videos. YouTube, as a social network site, 
allows users to influence what others watch by sharing videos and also by creating videos 
to influence viewing trends.88  
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Freely available social media networking sites revolutionized communication and 
gave every user a voice as it placed information in the hands of users and viewers. For 
example, “Posting on a social networking site is like throwing a stone in water, the 
ripples can reach far and wide.”89 In other words, as users post information on social 
networking sites that same information does not lose power at its initial post, as it has the 
potential of easily going viral when the information is reposted (or retweeted) to a 
different audience over one or more social networking platforms. Every person reposting 
the information acts as an independent source that furthers the dissemination while at the 
same time sparking a diversity of opinions, discussions, and commentary. The 
information repeated the most is obviously the information of interest among the 
majority; it is also information that most likely has emotional ties, common concerns, 
experiences, and/or issues among the majority.90 In sum, social media networking sites 
can be characterized by its ability of instant communication/interaction, real time 
dissemination of information, free access to information, speedy reaction to events, 
affordability, the ability to self publish,91 and most importantly, the ability to discuss 
sensitive topics openly that state-owned traditional (or conventional) media could not.  
B. THE RISE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS INCREASED MOMENTUM 
TOWARDS PROTESTS, STRIKES, AND DEMONSTRATIONS 
During the 1990s, street dissent was nonexistent in Egypt; Mubarak’s “dirty 
war”92 between Islamists militants banned public gatherings and demonstrations to the 
degree that trade unions were placed under government control. After a period of non-
mobilization, Egypt noticed the emergence of politics returning to Egypt in 2000–2001 
after the second Palestinian intifada that encouraged various political and social activists 
to protest and mobilize in the streets and universities for the Palestinian solidarity. 
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Although the protests were towards the Palestinian solidarity, they cleverly generated an 
anti-regime dimension and became the first significant protest where tens of thousands of 
Egyptians took to the streets and participated since the 1977 bread riots.93  
In 2003, the U.S. invasion of Iraq created outrage among Egyptians and 
approximately 30,000 Egyptians protested in Tahrir Square, clashed with police forces, 
and destroyed Mubarak’s billboards.94 The war in Iraq became the turning point for 
creating an anti-war wave of demonstrations in Egypt, starting with the birth of Kifaya! 
(Enough!) in 2004.95 Kifaya!, also known as the Egyptian Movement for Change, is a 
pro-Palestinian and anti-war movement. Kifaya! achieved a greater profile in 2005 during 
two important events, the constitutional referendum and the first multi-candidate 
presidential elections as the group overtly expressed rejection towards Mubarak’s fifth 
election term, as well as his efforts towards grooming his son to succeed him. 
Unfortunately, the group lost momentum as it became heavily criticized for its inability to 
reach the masses. The group appeared to reject strongly the status quo and Mubarak, in 
particular; however, its inability to provide qualified candidates or solutions to problems 
caused many to label the group as the pastime of a “bunch of kids.”96 Regardless of its 
criticism, Kifaya!, nevertheless, generated public attention and broke the taboo of overtly 
criticizing the president, while paving the road for other social movements to emerge and 
evolve. One group of significance is the April 6 Youth Movement. 
From 2004 forward, the number and frequency of worker activism, strikes, and 
demonstrations significantly increased. The years 2006 and 2008 signified the Mahalla al 
Kubra (Egypt’s dominant textile industry) strikes. In 2006, 27,000 workers went on strike 
demanding higher wages and delinquent bonuses to which they were entitled. 
Furthermore, the strikes also helped expose how privatization affected the working class. 
Elections of the General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions were rigged to favor the 
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government, and in reality, did not represent workers and their interests. In 2008, a 
Facebook group called April 6 Youth Movement was founded by Ahmed Maher to 
support workers of Mahalla al Kubra. The group used the Internet (social media and 
blogs), mobile telephones, and word of mouth to prepare, organize, and call for a strike 
on April 6, 2008 throughout the country against low wages and increased food prices.97 
However, security forces that infiltrated the factories and intimidated workers from going 
on strike aborted the strike; security and police forces also squashed similar rallies across 
the country. As a result, three protestors were killed, over 30 activists and 150 workers 
were arrested, and over 100 people were injured.98,99 
The April 6 Youth Movement failed in its efforts to generate enough anger and 
enthusiasm to get thousands of Egyptians out into the streets. There is no denying that 
Egyptians were angry and needed better wages to survive; however, the problem was 
their wages were already low enough, and therefore, they could not afford to go on strike 
and lose a day’s worth of pay. In other words, Egyptians were too poor to strike.100 In 
addition, security and police forces instilled enough intimidation that discouraged many 
Egyptians from striking for fear of being detained, fined, and incarcerated. Although it 
was a failed attempt to strike, be heard and demand change, it is safe to conclude that the 
April 6, 2008 strike was a rehearsal or a replica of a mini revolution to the 25 January 
Revolution that occurred almost three years later. Additionally, Kifaya! and the April 6 
Youth Movement inspired Egyptians to connect and form other pressure groups, such as 
Mohammed ElBaradei’s 2010 pressure group, the National Association for Change 
(NAC).  
ElBaradei, an opposition leader and former member of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, formed the NAC to represent all Egyptian voices of civil society in 
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efforts to work towards democracy and social justice, especially emphasizing the 
importance of free and fair election. From the time the NAC was formed, it gained a lot 
of support, including support from the Muslim Brotherhood.101  
One entity all the discussed movements shared is a common purpose or similar 
basic notions about Egypt’s future: democracy, free and fair elections, and social justice. 
All groups were important actors or “carrier groups”102 that formed the background of 
the 25 January Revolution.  
C. 2010 SENSITIVE EVENTS INCREASED EMOTIONS AND ANGER 
TOWARDS A COMMON PURPOSE 
Inequality, poverty, unemployment, government and election corruption, the 
emergency law, police brutality, wealth gaps, and economic stagnation have been 
embedded in Egyptians’ everyday lives and within society as a whole to the degree that 
they were tolerated and/or ignored due to the regime’s intimidation, harassments, and 
threats against those who complain. However, sensitive events in 2010 are assessed as 
possible factors that heightened tensions and easily brought those with deep repressed 
grievances and anger together against the regime. Such events allowed certain network 
building to exist, radiate out, and disperse throughout Egypt, while giving the world a 
front row seat to observe it all. Two significant events in particular linked anger to 
mobilization, the 2010 “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook page and the New Year’s Eve 
Alexandria church bombing.  
1. “We are all Khaled Said”  
“We are all Khaled Said” started as a Facebook page, after Egyptian businessman 
Khaled Said was brutality murdered by police forces for his attempt to try and expose 
corruption, and quickly transformed into a full anti-police brutality and abuse 
campaign.103 Wael Ghonim, the Google executive for the Middle East and North Africa, 
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created the page and managed it anonymously. The page had mobile telephone images 
posted of Said’s disfigured face, along with morgue images being contrasted against 
images of Said’s happier days. Along with heart-breaking YouTube videos of Khaled 
Said, the graphic images posted on Facebook, generated “emotional valence aimed at 
converting passivity into action.”104  
Like rigged elections corruption, police brutality has been occurring for so many 
years that over time, it became the norm under Mubarak’s Egypt and any complaints 
about torture and abuse were overlooked, and in certain cases, ignored by officials. With 
the increase of smartphones, many online activists exposed police brutality by posting 
online horrific videos and still photos on new media outlets of police abuse and torture. 
As a result, mobile telephones became such a threat to the police force that the Ministry 
of Interior tried to ban all mobile telephones from police stations claiming that mobile 
telephones disrupt work. Although the court refused to ban mobile telephones inside 
police stations, it is important to note that it was not just a coincidence that the ruling 
came shortly after Khaled Said was beaten to death by police officers.105  
Gruesome photos posted online of Khaled Said went viral and created an 
emotional collection reaction, “We are all Khaled Said” had more than 800,000 
members,106 70,000 of whom indicated their intent to partake in the January 25 
demonstrations, the first day of the Egyptian Revolution.107 According to Sidney Tarrow 
in Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, “The culture of 
collective action is built on frames and emotions oriented toward mobilizing people out 
of their compliance and into action in conflictual setting.”108 Said’s Facebook page 
accumulated many supporters who were outraged by police torture and brutality; most of 
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those supporters heavily contributed to the discontent that led to the protesting on 
National Police Day, January 25. The collective emotional reaction generated from 
Kahled Said’s disfigured body transformed that reaction into political action from 
hundreds of Egyptians who saw themselves as Khaled Said: captured, tortured, and 
beaten to death. Said’s torture, in this case, became everyone’s suffering. Wael Ghonim 
illustrated it best when he commented on Said’s photos of brutality and stated, “His photo 
after being killed by those police officers made all of us cry…I personally connected to 
him. This could be my brother.”109 
2. New Year’s Eve Alexandria Church Bombing 
Although religious (Muslim-Coptic) tensions and violence have been increasing 
over the last 40 years in Egypt, the Egyptian regime was notorious for denying such 
tensions and constantly sweeping the issue under the rug. The New Year’s Eve 
Alexandria church bombing was a hostile religious incident that generated mass panic 
among Egyptians (both Muslims and Copts) and increased tensions shortly before the 
revolution.110 After the church bombing, the government did not recognize the threat 
through formal channels, and therefore, methods to deal with the issue were never 
established. Such informal response to deal with dangerous religion issues is possibly due 
to the government’s effort to maintain the Sunni Muslim’s dominance over the country. 
The church attack left 23 killed and approximately 90 people injured; it was by far 
the one of the worst attacks against the Copts. A few days after the attack, Copts took the 
street to protest “…in the most powerful protest that Christian Copts ever held in recent 
history.”111 Coptic Christians were outraged when Mubarak gave credit to an Al-Qaeda 
affiliated network for the attack instead confronting the real threat that targets the 
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Copts.112 However, that is nothing new for the Copts in Egypt; the Copts (who account 
for approximately 10 to 12 percent of Egypt’s population) have been treated as second-
class citizens through varying discrimination from low representation in public 
office/elections to citizenship discriminating laws. Copts require presidential approval to 
repair churches and experienced more difficulties building new churches than Muslims 
building new mosques. It is nearly impossible for an Egyptian Copt to run for president 
and very unlikely for Egyptian Copts to hold government jobs or become deans and/or 
professors at public universities; most Copts are in private professions and are doctors, 
lawyers, business entrepreneurs, etc.113  
The Copts were fed up with the oppression and the lack of religious freedom 
under Mubarak’s regime. A human rights Coptic activist Wagih Yacoup best summarized 
the Coptic Christians frustrations when he stated the following, “We have suffered a lot 
as Christians. We’ve seen churches being bombed, innocent people being killed, girls 
being kidnapped, and the spread of Islamization against our will. We want to get rid of 
the dictatorship that we have been living under for over thirty years.”114 
The New Year’s Eve Alexandria church bombing heightened the Muslim-Coptic 
tensions, but also contributed to generating active participation from the Coptic minority 
during the 25 January Revolution. The Coptic population was aware that the government 
did not consider it urgent to respond to religious matters and often swept them under the 
rug; therefore, it was not surprising that the Copts’ participation and unity among Muslim 
Egyptians during the 25 January Revolution was a direct reflection of their frustration 
towards the regime and efforts to end tyranny.  
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D. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY: TUNISIA THE CATALYST THAT 
EMPOWERED APOLITICAL EGYPTIANS TO RISE 
Egyptians were well aware of their corrupt government and the poor conditions 
that Egypt experienced. However, the near apathy that many Egyptians had did not 
translate to their lack of hunger and desire towards reforms and change in Egypt. It is 
important to note that the new media encouraged dissent through a distant post online, 
rather than a bloody encounter with security forces. This online presence is assessed to 
have been the typical form of protesting until the Tunisians demonstrated that a more 
direct approach was needed to bring about the reforms that so many supported. In other 
words, support for reforms in Egypt has been present on the Internet through blogs and 
social media networks, but the institutions of the state and the coercive apparatus were 
such that there was little incentive and much to lose by taking action. For example, on 
May 25, 2005, opposition activists held a non-violent protest against the Egyptian 
constitutional referendum to protest against the amendments that they claimed to be anti-
democratic. Although the protest was peaceful, the police force and the government hired 
“thugs” still attacked and beat the innocent protestors and any others, including 
journalists present in the area. Additionally, sexual assaults of women during the protest 
later labeled as the “watershed moment”115 were also reported and witnessed. Horrific 
photos and videos of the event were publicized; however, the government still dismissed 
them as evidence and focused instead on targeting activists not content with the status 
quo.116  
Due to the frequent beatings, torture, and assaults cases reported of active 
activists, online activism increased. Active activists were simply waiting for a political 
opportunity to present themselves for their political dissents to move away from the 
comfort zone that the new media generated for them and into the traditional role of a 
political engagement that involved active protest with masses of like-minded people 
working toward the same objectives. The political opportunity was Tunisia.  
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In an act of desperation, Mohamed Bouazizi, a poor yet educated Tunisian 
produce vendor, lit himself on fire outside the governor’s house after he was insulted, 
humiliated, and ignored for attempting to plead his case to government officials to 
retrieve his unlicensed fruit cart after it was confiscated by government authorities. His 
death triggered a Tunisian uprising and in 23 days, the Tunisian government crumpled. 
The Tunisian Revolution was publicized on all media channels around the globe.117  
Egyptian opposition groups initially planned to protest on January 25 against 
police brutality and to demand the abolishment of the emergency law. January 25 was not 
originally intended for a revolution to occur, but was rather a day of mass protesting; 
however, Tunisia happened and Egypt’s planned protest was only 11 days after the 
Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was overthrown.118. Tunisia empowered 
Egyptians across the country to believe in change, especially those who were only online 
activists or were apolitical at first because they either submitted to the regime due to 
cowardice, were preoccupied with their own problems and efforts to make a living, or 
just less inclined towards a revolution in general.119 Tunisia was, therefore a political 
opportunity for Egyptians to rise as it inspired them to believe in the power of change; 
otherwise, it could be argued that the Egyptian revolution could have possibly taken 
longer to come about if it was not for Tunisia’s influence. The events that unfolded in 
Tunisia provided hope to Egyptians and showed that popular uprisings could topple the 
regime and bring the change that they previously avoided confrontation with or were 
perhaps only comfortable posting about and blogging.  
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E. IMMEDIATE EFFORTS LEADING TO THE 25 JANUARY 
REVOLUTION 
1. Planning and Training 
Traditional social mobilization strategies were vital from the beginning to the end 
of the revolution as it helped sustain the collective identity and action of the people. 
Although claimed as a leaderless and spontaneous revolution, a group of young and 
Internet savvy members and organizers were reported to having held face-to-face 
meetings before and throughout the uprising. During the revolution, such meetings were 
held in the evening and were towards efforts to cover the blueprint for the next day, to 
include routes, slogans, specific details, actors, etc. The highlights of the meetings would 
then be distributed the next day via SMS, email, and social media networks to other 
members and significant personnel.120 Those members were reportedly meeting at one of 
the members’ home twice a day, every day leading up to January 25. Days prior to 
January 25, the organizers began to sleep in various places for fear of being detained for 
their efforts.121 Clandestine meetings were vital to ensure all details were properly 
covered and courses of action were established. 
The organizers included personnel from six youth movements that ranged from 
social activists to labor rights groups. Although united for revolutionary common goals 
and shared ideas, those organizers came from different backgrounds. Their day jobs and 
social background varied. Some were associated with non-government organizations, 
some owned businesses, some held high-technology jobs, while others were full time 
political organizers; some were feminist or labor activist while others were religious 
leaders. However, what they all had in common was their relative youth, enthusiasm, and 
their collective identity. Those members originated from social movements, social groups 
such as Kifaya!, April 6 Movement, and NAC.122  
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Over the years, as the rise of social movements increased momentum towards 
protests, strikes, and demonstrations, the revolutionaries (or organizers) began to educate 
themselves on strategic non-violence methods of protesting, paying special attention to 
“…the ideas of Gene Sharpe, the American whose philosophy of radical civil protest 
derived from Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King and whose strategic thinking had 
inspired the Serbian youth group Otpor’s struggle against Slobodan Milosevic.”123 
Furthermore, some activists traveled to Serbia to receive political re-education, while 
others created the Academy of Change in Qatar in an effort to promote Sharpe’s ideas on 
non-violent struggle. Shortly prior to January 25, members of the Academy of Change 
and organizers from Serbia trained the Egyptian revolutionaries in Cairo and emphasized 
the importance of maintaining a non-violent approach towards protests and 
demonstrations.124 Furthermore, as momentum increased, organizers started turning to 
“young soccer fans to help them organize against police actions” since they had 
“experience with unruly mobs and police.”125  
2. Publicizing the First Day of the Revolution 
As mentioned earlier, the Egyptian population is slightly over 80 million people 
and Internet penetration account for no more than 24 percent. With only 24 percent of the 
population with Internet access, activists and organizers had to find other means to reach 
those Egyptians not online to participate on January 25. 
Over 85,000 Egyptian taxi drivers are on the crowded streets of Cairo. Egyptian 
taxi drivers are the most heterogeneous group of people in the Egyptian work force; many 
are college-educated individuals unemployed by the government, while others are 
supplementing their primary income by becoming taxi drivers. Most taxi drivers in Egypt 
are talkative and gregarious; they easily engage in conversations with their customers. 
Organizers of the 25 January Revolution decided to incorporate Egyptian taxi drivers 
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indirectly to disseminate information on the demonstrations occurring on January 25. 
Activists and organizers decided to not appeal to the taxi drivers directly, in case they 
attempted to argue or debate with them, but rather let them overhear a supposedly 
“secretive” telephone conversation that covered details of the first day and were most 
likely bound to repeat it to others, including their customers. The plan was a success; the 
message went viral and spread in Cairo on busses, in cafes, shops, mosques, universities, 
etc. Egyptians were aware that something big would happen in Tahrir Square on January 
25.126 
Away from the luxuriant neighborhoods in Cairo, activists and the revolution’s 
organizers were interested in targeting the slums of Cairo, Egyptians struggling to make a 
living and provide for their families, to increase protest participation on January 25. In 
poor neighborhoods, like the neighborhood of Imbaba in northern Cairo, Egyptians had 
little or no knowledge of the new media platforms. The urban poor areas were ideal for 
gathering people; anti-Mubarak social economic chants, banners, and slogans motivated 
the poor to participate. In turn, Egyptians began to leave their homes and join others on 
the streets. While chanting together, the poor were reminded of the harsh conditions they 
were living under and the basic necessities they were deprived of because they simply 
could not afford it. Their chants created a sense of collectiveness that encouraged and 
increased Egyptians to march towards Tahrir Square. In other words, Egyptians, 
especially the poor, were united by their collective struggle. As a result, the word of 
mouth went viral and brought tens of thousands of Egyptians out of their comfort zone 
and into the streets of Cairo. The collective struggle was so heart felt that it inspired other 
Egyptians in different cities (Alexandria, Suez, Ismailia, and Gharbeya) in Egypt to do 
the same.127  
                                                 




3. Information Dissemination (Without the Internet)  
For information access, dissemination, and communication, the new social media 
became an important tool before and during the revolution. However, after the first few 
days of the uprising leading to the revolution, the new media had little impact on the 
revolution due to an Internet and mobile telephones outage. Possibly, because of the 
outage, anonymous leaflets circulated in Cairo providing guidance and information to 
protesters. After the government shut down the Internet and mobile telephone access in 
the midst of protesting to cripple the protesters from communicating and disrupt the flow 
of communication, such disruption instead hindered the government’s efforts to conduct 
damage control and stall the protests. In fact, the disruption of the Internet and telephone 
lines encouraged traditional mobilization tactics, face-to-face communication, increased 
physical presence in the streets, and focal points locations transformed into various 
gatherings locations.128 In other words, Internet access did not significantly matter to 
Egyptians as momentum was up and because they already knew where to go and how to 
get there.  
Signed “Long Live Egypt,” anonymous leaflets circulated in Cairo during the 
revolution and provided tactical and practical advice and suggestions for mass 
demonstrations, such as aerial photos marked with approach routes, diagrams of 
formations, instructions on how to confront and defend against riot police, methods to 
protect each other, recommendation that banners and posters should be hung from 
apartment and office balconies, suggestion on specific slogans to chant during the 
protests, what to wear, what to carry, where to be, etc. In addition, it also stated that 
Egyptians should maximize redistribution of the leaflets through photocopies and/or 
email, but not on social media networks as security forces were monitoring social media 
networks.129  
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F. THE NEW MEDIA MEETS CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 
The government only discovered the importance of the new media during the 
revolution. Its limited mindset assumed that by cutting off Egyptians from Internet and 
mobile telephone access, it could stall the demonstrations. When its plan failed, the 
government attempted to use technology to its advantage when Internet and mobile 
telephone access were restored. For example, as soon the government restored Internet 
and mobile telephone access, it was well aware of Egypt’s high rate mobile usage, and 
therefore, sent out the following patriotic text message to all of its mobile telephone 
subscribers in hopes of reaching out to the mobilized youth to, again, stall the 
demonstrations. “Youth of Egypt beware rumors and listen to the sound of reason. Egypt 
is precious so look after her.”130 However, the text message had zero effect on Egypt’s 
mobilized youth.131  
As previously noted, the mobilized Egyptian youth account for 60 percent of the 
Egyptian population. It is the under 30, educated, and an Internet literate generation eager 
to demand its long overdue rights from its government to succeed in life. The Egyptian 
youth (social movements, activists, and organizers) was aware of the new media’s value 
in its ability to function as a tool; however, it was also aware that the new media was not 
its “magic bullet” to create a revolution on its own.132  
G. THE NEW MEDIA, AS A TOOL, HELPED SPREAD THE MESSAGE OF 
THE REVOLUTION 
1. Asmaa Mahfouz Video Blogs 
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On January 18 (exactly one week before the revolution), a 26-year-old activist 
Asmaa Mahfouz, also one of the founders of the April 6 Youth Movement, posted a 
video blog on Facebook directed to Egyptians to take a stand against the government. In 
her video, she stated the following:  
If you think yourself a man, come with me on 25 January. Whoever says 
women shouldn’t go to protests because they will get beaten, let him have 
some honor and manhood and come with me on 25 January. Whoever says 
it is not worth it because there will only be a handful of people, I want to 
tell him, ‘you are the reason behind this, and you are a traitor, just like the 
president or any security cop who beats us in the streets.’133  
Asmaa’s video went viral within days. It was uploaded to YouTube and reposted on 
Facebook. Many sources were labeling the video as the video blog that inspired 
Egyptians to participate on January 25. To understand how Asmaa’s video inspired others 
to take a stand against the regime, one must understand “…how a movement reaches 
critical mass in the digital world.”134  
The first step to tap into human emotions is to make a real, genuine video blog. 
Asmaa’s video blog did not have any special lighting, décor, or background music; her 
video was simple, brief, and she spoke from experience. Uploading her video to 
Facebook was a reality awakening to those stunned by her level of conviction. Here was a 
young veiled woman, brave enough to expose her identity, while being aware of the 
repercussions, in an effort to encourage others to take a stand against the regime and, as 
her video blog stated, “Go down to the street, send SMS (short message service), post it 
on the Internet, make people aware.”135 Asmaa’s video blog tapped into the social circle 
on Facebook. Since each person on Facebook has individual social micro networks, the 
video quickly disseminated as it was reposted from one micro network to another. 
Additionally, because many Facebook users connect their Facebook accounts to other 
social media networks, as members started reposting the video blog, it simultaneously 
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appeared on other social media networks. For example, on YouTube, the video blog 
became easier to find and access by those who did not have access to the Facebook post. 
As a result, the video blog spread like wildfire. The popularity of the video was so 
compelling to the degree that it was not just popular online; the video blog started being 
referenced in face-to-face conversations, and at the same time, further spreading the 
message among those friends offline. As Asmaa’s video blog gained popularity on social 
media platforms, it also encouraged online discussions through comments. Some 
criticized the video, some defended the video, and others supported the video and rallied 
behind the cause.136  
Asmaa released two additional video blogs in the same manner as her initial 
video. The second video was intended to be a follow-up video and was released on 
January 24. As the initial video gained popularity in the digital world and became a 
significant effort for an important event, the second video was critical to build up 
momentum. The video acknowledged the efforts of those Egyptians assisting in the setup 
of January 25 and the commitment of those who confirmed participation. The video also 
acknowledged the fear and nervousness felt by supporters and all other Egyptians taking 
a stand against the government on January 25. As expected, the second videos revived the 
attention of initial supporters, as well as attracting new supporters who either did not 
have an opportunity to see the initial video or chose to ignore it the first time around. In 
fact, the second video attracted more viewers because many Egyptians saw the second 
video before the first one, and some went back to search for the initial video. By the time 
Asmaa released the third video after January 25, the message was out. All three video 
blogs became “teaching tools for late comers to the cause, providing them with 
compelling, firsthand experiences of an Egyptian revolutionary.”137  
2. Facebook Groups 
Several Facebook groups were created before, during, and after the revolution. 
The most important and influential group of all was the “We are all Khaled Said” 
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Facebook page. As previously mentioned, “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook page drew 
in more than 800,000 members actively interacting and coordinating among one another 
through online comments, postings, messages, as well as SMS. However, other Facebook 
groups, such as the “Rasd News Network (RNN)” Facebook group, were also of 
importance as far as their notable effort to contribute to the revolution. RNN, for 
example, provided news and media reaction updates to the public during the events of the 
revolution. It also became a significant resource for protestors to obtain the times and 
locations of the protests, as well as warnings and instructions on how to defend 
themselves if approached by the regime’s hired thugs and/or the security forces.138  
RNN captured over 400,000 viewers, which was one of the reasons that led the 
regime to ban access to social networking sites. Through third-party proxy servers, 
Facebook groups were able to get around the filters and regain access. In turn, the regime 
decided to shut down Internet and mobile telephone access in hopes of disabling 
communication and mobilization. The regime’s effort to block access to social 
networking sites, followed by complete shutdown of Internet and mobile telephone 
access, were useless as Egyptians were already in the streets, already mobilized, and 
tuned into conventional media sources (such as Al Jazeera) for news updates.139  
H. THE NEW MEDIA GARNERED INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION 
TOWARDS EGYPT 
A significant generation gap exists between the Egyptian regime and the Egyptian 
youth population, assessed to be the tech-savvy individuals who used the new media 
platforms and networks as tools before and during the revolution. Since the average age 
of an Egyptian new media activist is in the twenties, the regime was less successful in 
regulating and monitoring the new media as it did not understand it. The average age of 
government members and officials is 60s to 70s, ruled by Mubarak who was 83 years old. 
The regime as a whole was underqualified to establish proper measures to fight the battle 
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of the new media in the digital age, as it simply did not comprehend it. Even if the regime 
did comprehend the new media, the government’s IT workers were underqualified as 
they were only hired because of their “loyalty” to the regime.140  
Due to such a generation gap, the Egyptian government was mainly concerned 
with the conventional, non-digital media. Therefore, the Egyptian regime heavily 
censored and monitored conventional media, especially during sensitive events. During 
the events of the revolution, the government tightly controlled what was published and 
often fabricated the truth. Al Ahram, an Egyptian state owned daily newspaper in 
circulation since 1875, and also the most widely distributed newspaper in the country, 
described the Egyptian protesters as nothing more than a minority group of troublemakers 
before Mubarak stepped down.141 Throughout Mubarak’s rule and before he stepped 
down, the conventional media restricted anything other than positive coverage on 
government activities to the point that even privately owned satellite stations were not 
exempt from such regulation.  
Like BBC and CNN, Al Jazeera, for example, provided comprehensive and 
accurate around the clock coverage “broadcasting live images from Tahrir Square, 
sending live updates and clear messages to protestors on the critical gathering points”142 
while allowed the entire world to follow the events as they were unfolding. As a result, 
Nilesat (the Egyptian government run satellite transmission) dropped Al Jazeera 
Mubasher on January 27 in the midst of protesting, while detaining six English Al 
Jazeera journalists the following day and confiscating their camera equipment.143 The 
regime prior to January 25, and even in the midst of the demonstrations, attempted 
everything in its power to crack down and silence the conventional media (banning, 
chasing, and attacking journalists and reports); however, it was nearly impossible to 
silence the new media.  
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During the protesting, the social media was used as an outlet to update the rest of 
the world, broadcast, and disseminate information in real time. Egyptian demonstrators 
were reported setting up online hubs during the protesting in Tahrir Square to disseminate 
information as it happened and upload clips of the protests shortly after they were filmed 
using web live streaming devices. In addition, through activists’ posts, online interaction, 
and communication, Twitter hashtag #25JAN became an identification to encourage 
Egyptians to come out and participate in the protests marked for January 25. As a result, 
following the first day of protesting on January 25, the hashtag date stamp was utilized to 
gather information and updates on the protests, and was also used by other Middle 
Eastern countries as their identification of individual unrest.144  
Furthermore, YouTube users on scene posted live footage of violence against 
peaceful protestors. With the world watching, the digital frontlines generated expressed 
interest and support from the international community. The digital frontline exposed what 
the Egyptians were fighting for, and as a result, the regime shut down access to the 
Internet and mobile telephone services for a few days before restoring it as to them, it 
was a threat they could not control. The new media allowed Egyptians to upload on social 
media networks “some of the pictures and video clips showing the massacres conducted 
by the central police forces and thugs on civilians during the early days of protests; live 
bullets, snipers, people run by cars, others beaten to death, thugs with machetes, Molotov 
cocktails thrown on protestors and many other indescribable atrocities.”145 
The new media garnered international attention towards Egypt when Google 
stepped in to help the Egyptians. Google created a new system for Egyptians called 
“speak2tweet” to continue passing information without Internet access. Google allowed 
Egyptians to used landlines and “call in and leave a voicemail that would appear on a 
web page linked to Google’s Twitter messages, hash tagged with the word ‘Egypt.’”146  
                                                 
144 “Arab Revolt: Social Media and the People,” Channel 4 News, February 25, 2011, 
http://www.channel4.com/news/arab-revolt-social-media-and-the-peoples-revolution.  
145 Qsam, “The eRevolution.”  
146 Shah and Sardar, Sandstorm: A Leaderless Revolution in the Digital Age, 67–69. 
 55
Additionally, activists and organizers sought the assistance of Richard Allan, the 
Facebook’s director of policy for Europe, to ensure important Facebook pages associated 
with the revolution, such as “We are all Khaled Said,” were continuously being 
monitored for all activity to prevent third-party hacking and to also protect against 
disabling mechanisms.147  
Furthermore, Egyptians living abroad were also supporters of the revolutionary 
cause. During the Internet blackout, using landlines and fax services, Egyptians living 
abroad would receive faxes through regular landlines from their families/friends in Egypt, 
and in turn, would “use Optical Character Recognition (OCR) technologies to convert the 
fax image into text contents, and post the contents, news and updates into Facebook, 
Twitter and different blogs.”148 Another example of an individual going above and 
beyond is a man by the name of Shervin Pishevar. Shervin tweeted so much on the 
Egyptian Revolution that he ended up exceeding his tweet limit. Working towards 
maintaining the lines of communication open between Egypt and the rest of the world, 
Shervin began an organization called OPENMESH, which functioned independently of 
Tweeter. OPENMESH aimed at generating a system of open mesh routers to eliminate a 
total Internet outage in case the government decided to halt Internet access again.149  
With unfiltered coverage of the revolution, people from around the globe were 
able to watch the events as they were unfolding in real time. The new media garnered 
international attention towards Egypt, and as a result, generated supporters willing to step 
in and offer their services towards disseminating information, rallying the world, and 
most importantly, furthering the cause.150  
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I. THE MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION 
Based on the researched information discussed, the author returns to the main 
research question, how did social media impact and/or affect the creation and 
mobilization of social movements against an authoritarian regime, as observed during the 
25 January Revolution? 
The third hypothesis, which states that social media was a vital tool but only one 
of many tools that enabled preexisting networks to override state repressive measures, 
smoothed the progress of social mobilization, and to some limited extent, had an impact 
on the outcome of the revolution, is the closest hypothesis in answering the research 
question. This hypothesis does not downplay the role of the new social media in 
facilitating the transmission of the message and mobilization of resources; however, the 
new social media is not a rationale for the revolution. The praiseworthy actions taken by 
the Egyptians in Tahrir Square and around the country were the key actors involved, not 
the various media tools available to spread the message. The researched information 
discussed proves that social media was not a pillar of the revolution in and of itself.  
The outcome of the 25 January Revolution was the result of the following tools, 
events, and factors: rise of social movements over the years; increased momentum 
towards protests, strikes, and demonstrations; sensitive events (Alexandria church 
bombing and “We are all Khaled Said”) that increased emotions and anger towards a 
common purpose, traditional social mobilization strategies (face-to-face planning, 
meetings, coordinating, and training), creativity of resource utilization (taxi drivers, 
soccer fans, and poor neighborhoods’ participation), a political opportunity (Tunisia), 
dedicated, brave, and fully charged organizers, activists, ordinary citizens (both Muslims 
and Copts), and outside supporters; conventional media, and of course, digital technology 
to include nonconventional media (social media and mobile telephones).  
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IV. CONCLUSION  
A. OWNERSHIP OF THE 25 JANUARY REVOLUTION 
Margaret Mead’s, an American cultural anthropologist, famous quote best 
illustrates the power of the people in relevance to the 25 January Revolution. “Never 
doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, 
it is the only thing that ever has.”151 Although the new media, to include social media, 
had a limited impact and/or effect on the creation and mobilization of social movements 
against Mubarak and his regime, Egyptians recognized other factors that also had an 
impact on the outcome of the revolution. “Thank God. Thanks to all who died for us to 
live in freedom. Thanks to all the Egyptians who slept rough in Tahrir, Alexandria, and 
everywhere...thank you Tunisia” and “…thanks to the international solidarity.”152 The 25 
January Revolution was the product of the Egyptian disgruntled citizens; their 
motivation, dedication, passion, performance, and creativity have generated one of the 
most important democratic movements, or a “world historical event,” in the Arab 
world.153 With or without the help of the new media, Egyptians have always been unitary 
in wanting freedom, justice, economic prosperity and self-rule; it was only a matter of 
time before the dictatorship would fall.  
Along with traditional methods of mobilization, current events, and political 
opportunities, the new media facilitated the creation of social movements, mobilization, 
and generated a new mode of action. For example, by allowing Egyptians to circumvent 
state censorship, social media allowed everyday citizens to self-publish online videos, 
blogs, etc. (i.e., Asmaa Mahfouz Video Blogs), expose the regime’s atrocities (online  
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pictures and videos of Khaled Said), and to disseminate information easily and interact 
(instantly and in real time) with like-minded individuals who have common grievances at 
a low transactional cost.  
For Egypt’s youth bulge, or Egypt’s college graduates with no future, technology, 
without a doubt, “…expanded the space and power of the individual.”154 Additionally, 
“The fact that regimes go (went) to such trouble to monitor, identify, capture, beat, 
torture, and jail young people using online tools suggests that they, at least, see the power 
of the new media.”155 However, with a population of over 80 million people, Internet 
penetration only accounts for approximately 24 percent, and therefore, traditional 
methods of creating social movements, organizing, and mobilizing were employed before 
and during the revolution. In other words, the new media did not inevitably lead to the 
downfall of Mubarak and his supporting regime but it did somewhat shift the balance of 
power to favor the Egyptian people; Egyptians “…just know more than they used to” and 
“have better understanding of power.”156 Nevertheless, the ownership of the 25 January 
Revolution will always belong to the Egyptian people and not to social media or any 
other tools. The revolution, as Google executive Wael Ghonim stated during his 60-
minute interview on CBS, “…is like Wikipedia…Everyone contributing small pieces, 
bits and pieces. We drew this whole picture of a revolution. And no one is the hero in that 
picture.”157 Characterized as a leaderless revolution, the people, without a question, are 
the individuals that impacted the outcome of the 25 January Revolution and not the tools 
employed by them. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH DESIGN ON THE NEW MEDIA 
Social media, based on the research conducted in this thesis, had a limited role on 
the outcome of the revolution, as well as the unrest that spread like wildfire in other Arab 
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countries; therefore, it is very possible that its role may increase in contentious politics 
and civil society in the future. In the mean time, social media will continue to be either 
overexaggerated or criticized for its role and the level of impact it had on the outcome of 
the revolution. Pessimists emphasize how social media can actually be a double-edged 
sword by helping authoritarian regimes track and monitor its citizens. Furthermore, other 
skeptics believe that social media, when used as a tool to aid in social mobilization, can 
encourage slacktivism; in addition, they claim that social media may be nothing more 
than just a trendy “hook” for citizens to tell political stories.158 Regardless on how social 
media will be judged in future academic work, it is too early to evaluate its role properly 
as little rigorous research is currently conducted to analyze the casual effects and its 
consequences on the creation, organization, and mobilization of social movements. 
Nevertheless, “Scholars and policymakers should adopt a more nuanced view of new 
media’s role in democratization and social change, one that recognizes that new media 
can have both positive and negative effects.”159  
Current assessments indicate that no proper measures of methodological 
foundations are in place to aid with understanding the relationship of the new media with 
the creation, organization, and mobilization of social movements under authoritarian 
regimes; in turn, a problem for policymakers, activists, and social scientists is created. To 
act effectively in today’s technological and fast-paced world, scholars and policymakers 
must understand the casual relationship. Case selection, counterfactuals, hidden variables, 
causal mechanisms, environmental impacts,160 system effects, new media outlet 
selection, and strategic interaction must be all considered during the research design. Just 
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before general conclusions can be made In other words, to understand the impact of the 
new media, both successes and failures must be properly understood, examined, studied, 
and even challenged.161  
Proper research design on new media tools can turn into valuable open source 
collection tool in an effort to understand the motivation of those who strive to create 
political change under repressive authoritarian governments. Equally important, the new 
social media can offer analysis on why allied and antagonistic regimes may possibly re-
strategize domestic and foreign policies (as they see fit) depending on whether or not the 
new social media threatens their rule.  
C. HYPOTHESES ANALYSIS 
This thesis presented three possible explanations of the impact of the new social 
media on social mobilization and the outcome of the 25 January Revolution were 
presented in this thesis. The first hypothesis or the null hypothesis, which states that 
social media had no critical impact on sustained social mobilization and the outcome of 
the Egyptian Revolution, along with the second hypothesis, which is the antithesis of the 
first, are safe to eliminate. Research proved that social media did have an impact, but a 
limited impact just as equivalent as traditional strategies of social organization and 
mobilization.  
Furthermore, the second hypothesis, which argues that social media was the most 
critical factor in achieving sustained social mobilization impacting the outcome of the 
revolution, is an over-exaggeration of the role of the new media. The second hypothesis 
is “…blind to hidden variables, confuse output with impact, or assume casual 
relationships that may be spurious.”162 Journalists, writers, and reporters who support the 
second hypothesis often prefer to focus on heroic-like stories of activists over complex 
arguments, and therefore, may possibly ignore serious analysis of the effects of the new 
media on contentious politics.163  
                                                 




The third hypothesis states that social media was a vital tool that enabled 
preexisting networks to override state repressive measures. However, social media was 
only one of many tools (or factors) that smoothed the progress of social mobilization, and 
to some limited extent, impacted the outcome of the revolution, came the closest in 
answering the main research question. The research conducted proved that social media 
was not a rationale for the revolution. The new media tools were nothing more than tools 
used to disseminate information, facilitate communication, organization, and 
mobilization; the desire for political reforms were present before the tweets, YouTube 
videos, and Facebook posts. Additionally, traditional methods (face-to-face planning, 
meetings, etc.), or an offline program, were just as important in achieving same effects as 
the new media tools had on the 25 January Revolution. In fact both, an online and offline 
program, were equally significant tools used by Egyptians to impact the outcome of the 
revolution.  
D. THE WAY AHEAD 
The story of the Egyptian revolution began when Egyptians, who lived under an 
oppressive dictatorship for decades, finally took a stand against their regime. Both the 
over-exaggeration of the social media’s role, and impact during the revolution and the 
downplaying of its role and impact on the revolution, are incorrect. Many media sources 
gave too much credit to social media and often labeled it as the “Facebook and Twitter 
revolution” while dismissing the role of Egypt’s most important asset, the Egyptian 
citizens.  
Without a doubt, the people used both online and offline strategies and tools to 
facilitate communication, organization, and mobilization before and during the 
revolution. Although media sources may have placed more emphasis on the new media 
tools, the revolution would not have been possible if it were not for all the offline 
strategies (face-to-face planning, training, meetings, organizing, and coordinating) used, 
as well as the creativity of using other resources, such as taxi drivers, to spread the word 
on the mass demonstrations. Additionally, political opportunities (such as Tunisia’s  
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revolution) and open source events (such as the police brutality of Khaled Said and the 
New Year’s church bombing) also aided in revolutionizing Egyptians “…against an 
archaic, unjust, and inefficient system, or way of doing things.”164  
The power of the new media is, without a doubt, dependent on those individuals 
who utilize it. The new media is today’s tool, and therefore, cannot be excluded from 
other forms of communication, expression, or action in the future.165 In today’s fast-
paced world, the new media changed, and will continue to change, the media 
environment through the power of the World Wide Web.  
During revolutionary events or mass demonstrations, media sources can 
sometimes skew perceptions of an event by not presenting all of the details to the story; it 
is, in their defense, difficult to report on everything, and therefore, selectivity is 
inevitable. As a result, media sources often have the power to present events as a 
Hollywood script (as observed during the 25 January Revolution): Mubarak and his 
oppressive regime (the bad guys) toppled by a group of young Egyptians (the good guys) 
armed with nothing more than smartphones, Facebook and Twitter accounts. However, as 
this thesis has illustrated, that was not the case or the complete story. The 25 January 
Revolution was not a Hollywood movie, “…dictatorial regimes are not nearly as 
vulnerable, citizens are not nearly as organized, and new media not nearly as powerful” 
as these media sources and narratives assumed.166  
The events that unfolded in Egypt proved that leaderless, non-violent uprisings 
could topple the regime (with or without social media). Although Egyptians successfully 
toppled authoritarianism through online and offline tools, tactics, and strategies, Egypt 
will still experience difficulties towards its road to a liberal and democratic society. After 
a revolution, a civil war, an uprising, and major protests, demonstrations and strikes, 
countries usually take time to let the dust settle before they can reconstruct itself socially, 
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economically, and politically; the more the causalities and violence used, the harder it 
will be. Nevertheless, one thing is evident. Revolutions occurred before the new media, 
and therefore, the new social media was not a pillar of the revolution in and of itself. 
Technology will continue to expand, improve and become more of a crucial tool in the 
future; however, it will never alone by itself topple an authoritarian regime. The human 
agency is the most important player in any revolution past, present, and future.  
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